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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALTON H. DAVIS, by and through 
his Guardian, GEORGE A. DAVIS, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, 
a corporation, and ROBERT S. 
CLARK, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7905 
The only issue to be determined by this appeal is 
whether the trial court erred in granting respond-
ents' motions to dismiss appellant's complaint (R. 8 
and 9). 
The parties herein will be referred to hereafter 
as they appeared in the court below, as plaintiff and 
defendants, respectively. 
The material allegations of the complaint are 
substantially summarized in plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts. However, some allegations of the complaint, 
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which this defendant deems of great importance, 
are not referred to at all by plaintiff. 
It is alleged by Paragraph 3 of plaintiff's "First 
Claim" that Provo City "caused barriers and signs 
to be set up on the hill for the purpose of regulating 
coasting and clearly marking the area as a coasting 
area, and prior to the accident caused to be publicized 
and advertised that this area had been established 
as a coasting area and was under the direction of 
the Provo City Recreation Department." (R. 3) 
These allegations are in contradiction of Paragraph 
4 to the effect that defendants Provo City and Brig-
ham Young University, having knowledge, "did will-
fully and negligently fail to take any steps to guard 
or protect the said children against injury." (R. 3). 
By Paragraph 5 it is alleged that plaintiff collided 
with an automobile of the defendant Clark being 
operated by said defendant on Eighth North Street 
(R. 4). 
The foregoing allegations are substantially, if 
not verbatim, repeated and set forth in plaintiff's 
"Second Claim" (R. 4). There follows what plaintiff 
has designated as his "Third Claim," in which it is 
alleged, in substance, that the injuries to plaintiff 
were the result of the negligence of defendant Clark 
(R. 6). 
Defendant Brigham Young University will 
limit its presentation of the case to the allegations 
of negligence or wrong-doing which are charged 
against it by plaintiff. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
1. THE LAW OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE HAS 
NO APPLICATION TO THE FACTS ALLEGED BY 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
2. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ALLEGES NO AC-
TIONABLE NEGLIGENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT, 
BRIGHA~ YOUNG UNIVERSITY. 
3. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOWS UPON ITS 
FACE THAT THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY PLAIN-
TIFF WERE THE DIRECT AND PROXIMATE RESULT 
OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT, CLARK. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE. THE LAW OF ATTRACTIVE NUIS-
ANCE HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE FACTS AL-
LEGED BY PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
This court, in the case of Brown v. Salt Lake 
City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570, adopted as the law of 
this jurisdiction the doctrine of the "turntable 
cases." That case involved an action for wrongful 
death brought against Salt Lake City for the death 
of plaintiff's intestate. The deceased, a boy of eight 
years met his death when he fell into a conduit which 
conveyed the waters of City Creek Canyon into the 
Jordan River. Access to this conduit was obtained 
through a long, dark tunnel. It was shown by the 
evidence that children were attracted to this tunnel 
to play, that officers of the city knew of this childish 
practice. Plaintiff asserted that the city was liable 
because it negligently failed to guard the tunnel 
entrance when it had knowledge of the presence of 
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children. A verdict in favor of the plaintiff was 
affirmed. The court made the following observation 
regarding the application of the doctrine of attrac-
tive nuisance: 
" * * * We are constrained to hold, there-
fore, that the doctrine of the turntable cases 
should be applied to all things that are un-
common and are arti jicially produced, and 
which are attractive and alluring to children 
of immature judgment and discretion, and 
are inherently dangerous,. and where it is 
practical to guard them without serious in-
convenience and without great expense to the 
owner. * * * " (Italics ours.) 
In adopting this rule, the court followed the case 
of Peters v. Bowman (California), 4 7 P. 598. The 
court in the Peters case, supra, made the following 
statement of the principles to be applied to this type 
of case, which this court specifically approved and 
adopted: 
'' * * * The owner of a thing dangerous 
and attractive to children is not always and 
universally liable for an injury to a child 
tempted by the attraction. His liability bears 
a relation to the character of the thing, 
whether natural and common, or artificial 
and uncommon; to the comparative ease or 
difficulty of preventing the danger without 
destroying or impairing the usefulness of the 
thing; and, in short, to the reasonableness 
and propriety of his own conduct, in view of 
all surrounding circumstances and conditions. 
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As to common dangers, existing in the order 
of nature, it is the duty of parents to guard 
and warn their children, and, jailing to do so, 
they should not expect to hold others respons-
ible for their own want of care. But, with 
respect to dangers specially created by the 
act of the owner, novel in character, attrac-
tive and dangerous to children, easily guarded 
and rendered safe, the rule is, as it ought to 
be, different. * * * " (Italics ours.) 
Following the Brown case, supra, this court 
decided the case of Charvoz v. Salt Lake City, 42 
Utah 455, 131 P. 901, which was also a case involving 
a claim for damages for wrongful death of a child 
seventeen months old who was drowned when it 
fell into an open ditch conveying the warm sulphur 
waters of a natural spring. The claim was made by 
plaintiff that the stream of water consituted an at-
tractive nuisance. This court rejected this claim 
and reversed a judgment in Plaintiff's favor. In 
that opinion this court, at great length, discusses the 
principles of the Brown case, supra. This court 
points out that the thing causing injury, before it 
can be classified as an attractive nuisance, must be 
uncommon and novel, and furthermore points out 
that a stream, such as the one involved in that case, 
could not be an attractive nuisance because there 
was nothing artificial about it, though probably 
man-made. See also Peterson v. Farmers' Grain & 
Milling Co., 69 Utah 395, 255 P. 436; Payne v. Utah-
Idaho Sugar Co., 62 Utah 598, 221 P. 568. 
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The foregoing authorities are in harmony with 
65 C. J. S. 465, Section 29 ( 7) to this effect: 
"The attractive nuisance doctrine does 
not apply to natural conditions, but only to 
dangerous things or conditions artificially 
created. It has also been held that the doc-
trine should not be extended to cases where 
the thing or condition complained of is similar 
to, or a reproduction of, nature. * * * " 
See also Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec-
tion 339, Clause (c), page 920, and comment on page 
925, as follows : 
'' * * * This does not require him (the land 
owner) to keep his land free from conditions 
which even young children are likely to ob-
serve and the full extent of the risk involved 
in which they are likely to realize. * * * " 
In 38 American Jurisprudence, Section 151, 
Negligence, page 817, the following rules applicable 
to "attractive nuisance" cases are set out: 
" * * * However, one important condition 
of the application of the doctrine of attrac-
tive nuisance is that the danger to the child be 
caused by the attraction itself, or by some-
thing with which the attraction brings the 
child in contact * * * but it doe~ not protect 
a child, as against the owner of the premises, 
in respect of a danger which was not incident 
to the place, but was created by the child 
himself with instrumentalities procured by 
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him off the premises, or by a third person. 
* * * 
" * * * A danger which is not only obvious 
but natural, considering the instrumentality 
from which it arises, is not within the mean-
ing of the attractive nuisance doctrine, for 
the reason that an owner or occupant is en-
titled to assume that the parents or guardians 
of a child will have warned him to avoid such 
a peril. * * * " 
With the foregoing rules in mind it is readily 
seen that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Brigham 
Young University was properly granted. An ex-
amination of plaintiff's complaint discloses no al-
legation of an affirmative act committed by this 
defendant. It is alleged that Brigham Young Uni-
versity permitted Provo City to create the coasting 
area, to post signs, warnings and barriers along and 
at the foot of the hill. It is not alleged that any of 
these acts were the proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injury. In that connection it is submitted that the 
placing of signs and barriers did not render the 
premises more hazardous than they were before this 
was done. This action, on the contrary, rendered 
the use of the hill less hazardous to plaintiff by giving 
warning to the public of the fact that the hill was 
designated as a coasting area from which notice the 
traveling public would be under a duty to anticipate 
its use by children. That it must be alleged before 
this doctrine can apply that the owner created or 
permitted the creation of a thing or condition which 
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rendered his premises more hazardous than they 
were before the artificial condition was created is 
abundantly supported by the foregoing authorities. 
Furthermore, it is respectfully submitted that' with 
respect to this hill there was no artificial condition 
created. The hill remained in the same natural con-
dition that it had been in prior to its designation and 
posting as a coasting area. 
It is contended by plaintiff that the steepness of 
the hill rendered it unfit for coasting because it was 
apparent, or should have been apparent, that a sled 
would be propelled out into a public highway and 
could not be brought to a stop before entering the 
highway. Precisely to guard against this danger, 
Provo City, in recognition of said danger, posted the 
signs and warnings for the general public. There-
fore, it is submitted that the City, by its action, made 
the situation less hazardous by providing such safe-
guards. 
It is perfectly apparent from the complaint that 
the injury to the plaintiff was not caused by any act 
of Provo City or Brigham Young University in con-
nection with the hill. Since the hill was changed in 
no way, it remained as it was before in its natural 
condition. The foregoing authorities support the 
proposition that the attractive nuisance doctrine has 
application only to instrumentalities or conditions 
artificially created by act of the owner of the land 
or of some other person or individual with his con-
sent, and those things or conditions so created by 
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the land owner n1ust be the proximate cause of in-
jury to the child involved. Brown v. Salt Lake City, 
supra; Charvoz v. Salt Lake City, supra. There be-
ing nothing uncommon, artificial or novel in the 
situation refel'red to in plaintiff's complaint, the 
doctrine can have no application. 
On the face of the complaint it is apparent that 
there were two forces which came into play, over 
which Brigham Young University had no control, 
which were the direct cause of injury and which had 
no relation to the condition of the coasting hill. The 
first of these was the act of the child himself who, by 
the use of his own instrumentality, the sled, brought 
by him upon the premises propelled him into a place 
of danger where he was injured. The second of these 
causes of injury was the action of the defendant, 
Clark, over whom it is not alleged by the complaint 
that Brigham Young University had any control 
whatsoever and who operated his automobile along 
the street where the collision with the sled occurred. 
38 American Jurisprudence, Section 152, page 820, 
supra. 
The attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply 
to this case because the danger was an obvious and 
natural one which the owner was entitled to assume 
the child himself could see or about which the owner 
could assume he had been warned by his parents. 
Brown v. Salt Lake City, supra.; 38 American Juris-
prudence, Section 151, page 818, supra; McHugh v. 
Reading Co. (Pennsylvania), 30 A 2d 122. 
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Finally, the doctrine does not apply where an 
efficient responsible cause intervenes to break the 
chain of causation set in motion by the negligence of 
the land owner. Assuming, for the sake of argu-
ment, therefore, that Brigham Young University 
might have been negligent, that negligence was 
broken by the act of defendant, Clark, who, it is 
alleged by plaintiff, negligently operated his automo-
bile into a collision with the plaintiff. Arkans·as Val-
ley Trust Co. v. Mcilroy (Arkansas), 133 S. W. 816: 
'' * * * The testimony on the part of de-
fendants tended to prove that when said Berg 
left the fire it had about died out, and that 
only in a low place where the grass was damp 
it was still smoldering; and that the plaintiff 
took some paper and ignited it at such smold-
ering fire, and with the lighted paper at-
tempted to set on fire grass at another place 
in the yard, and thereby ignited her clothes. 
Such alleged act was an efficient intervening 
cause which resulted in the injury. It was 
not the probable and natural consequence of 
the setting out of the fire by Berg, but was as 
independent of it as if the child had set fire 
to the paper with matches and therefrom had 
ignited her clothes. For such act the de-
fendants would not be liable, even though 
Berg was negligent in setting out the fire. 
* * * The act of the plaintiff in lighting the 
paper and therefrom igniting her clothes 
while she herself was attempting to set other 
grass on fire was a new and independent force 
which caused the injury, and the act of Berg 
in setting out the fire would be too remote 
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to be the cause thereof; and therefore no lia-
bility for the injury sustained under such 
circumstances could be fastened upon the de-
fendants even though Berg was negligent in 
leaving the fire unguarded. * * * " 
See also 38 American J U'tisprudence, Section 
152, page 820, in which the following is said: 
"The intervention of an efficient, respon-
sible cause of an injury to a child relieves the 
wrongdoer from responsibility for his negli-
gence in maintaining an attractive nuisance 
upon his premises. * · * * " 
In his brief plaintiff confesses his inability 
to discover a case where the doctrine of attractive 
nuisance has been applied to the situation described 
in the complaint now under consideration. 
POINT TWO. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AL-
LEGES NO ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE AGAINST 
DEFENDANT, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY. 
Defendant Brigham Young University contends 
that its Motion to Dismiss was properly granted by 
the trial court for the reason that plaintiff's com-
plaint fails to allege any act or omission on its part 
constituting actionable negligence. 
The complaint shows upon its face that if Brig-
ham Young University was in fact negligent in any 
one or more of the acts which have been charged 
against it, such act or acts were not the proximate 
cause of the injuries claimed to have been suffered 
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by plaintiff. It is elementary that negligence con-
sists in doing or failing to do something which an 
ordinary, reasonable person would do or refrain 
from doing under the circumstances. It is likewise 
elementary that before an act of negligence will sus-
tain a claim for damages, it must be shown to be the 
proximate cause of the injury complained of. Be-
cause of the uncounted number of times that these 
propositions have been affirmed by the courts, it is 
not deemed necessary to cite any authority for them. 
In the light of these two propositions, an exam-
ination of plaintiff's complaint reveals an entire 
absence of any action on the part of this defendant 
which would sustain liability. All that plaintiff 
contends so far as Brigham Young University is 
concerned is that it permitted Provo City to create a 
recreational coasting area upon its property for 
children, that it permitted Provo City to place signs 
and barriers along and at the end of its property 
where it bounded on a public highway, notifying the 
public that the area in question had been set aside 
for coasting. The· most that can be said for the 
complaint is that it alleges that the hill was unsuit-
able for coasting by children because it was steep 
and because it was in proximity to a public street 
along which it should have been apprehended auto-
mobiles, and particularly the automobile of the de-
fendant Clark, would travel with the likelihood that 
a collision might ensue between such an automobile 
and a sled being used by some child. Such allega-
tions are insufficient as basis for liability based upon 
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claimed negligence. Plaintiff would have the court 
hold that Brigham Young University was under a 
duty to foresee a situation where an automobile. 
driver would ignore the warning notices and dis-
regard the barrier set up to protect the area and the 
children which might be using it. 
The law does not require one to anticipate that 
a third party, acting independently and not under 
the control of such person, will disregard his duty 
to use due care or that he may violate the law, which 
action might conceivably result in damage or injury 
to another toward whom a duty may be owing. This 
proposition is well illustrated in the decision of this 
court in Davis v. Mellen, 55 Utah 9, 182 P. 920, 
wherein this court said: 
"But conceding that the defendant was 
negligent in all the particulars complained of, 
the question still remains, was the defend-
ant's negligence the proximate cause of the 
injuries? We think not. The plaintiff's own 
testimony conclusively establishes that imme-
diately before the accident, when he was in 
the passageway, he appreciated and knew of 
the closed section of the street. He had driven 
his automobile over State Street but a day or 
two before and had passed through the pass-
ageway. He remembered it, and, as he was 
approaching the closed or barricaded section, 
he followed the traveled track of vehicles 
fully conscious of the fact that he was enter-
ing it. Unobstructed, there was ample room 
for his automobile to pass in safety any ap-
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proaching vehicle from the north or opposite 
direction. Left standing unattended In the 
passageway, without lights or other signals 
of warning upon them, were the two wagons 
of the Salt Lake Transfer Company, closing 
it so that vehicles moving in opposite direc-
tions could not pass. As plaintiff entered the 
passageway where the wagons stood he saw 
an automobile with an unknown driver dash-
ing through the passageway at a speed of not 
less than 30 miles an hour. Plaintiff was 
driving 20 miles an hour. A headon collision 
was imminent, to avoid which he quickly 
turned his machine into the wire of the barri-
cade and was injured. Had the wagons not 
been left standing in the passageway plaintiff 
would have passed through in perfect safety. 
Had the approaching driver not been driving 
his machine at so reckless a speed no danger 
would have confronted plaintiff, and he would 
have had time to pass without accident. The 
plaintiff so testified. The closing of the pass-
ageway by the wagons so that two vehicles 
could not pass, and leaving them there without 
signals and unattended through the night, and 
the reckless speed with which the automobile 
was driven through it by the unknown driver, 
were the two contributing and the proximate 
causes of the plaintiff's injuries, of neither 
of which did the defendant have any knowl-
edge, nor was he, under the circumstances, 
in duty bound to anticipate. 
"Admitting that the barricades were in-
sufficient about the closed section of the 
street, that they were left without lights or 
proper signals of warning, yet the fact re-
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mains beyond any dispute, had it not been 
for the wrongful acts of others in leaving the 
wagons standing in the detour or passageway, 
and the reckless manner in which the automo-
bile driven from the north approached the 
plaintiff, which, as we have pointed out, were 
the sole proximate causes of the accident, the 
plaintiff would have passed by the closed 
section of the street without harm, regardless 
of any act of omission or commission charged 
against the defendant.'' 
As long as the actions of a party have no causal 
connection in law with the injury there can be no 
liability. Davis v. Mellen, supra; Southern Pacific 
Co. v. Ralston, Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Cir-
cuit, 62 Fed. 2d 1026. Among other statements, 
the Ralston case supra quotes the following from 
Wharton on the Law of Negligence, Section 134, to 
this effect : 
"Supposing that if it had not been for the 
intervention of a responsible third party the 
defendant's negligence would have produced 
no damage to the plaintiff, is the defendant 
liable to the plaintiff? This question must 
be answered in the negative, for the general 
reason that causal connection between negli-
gence and damage is broken by the interposi-
tion of independent responsible human action. 
I am negligent on a particular subject matter. 
Another person, moving independently, comes 
in, and either negligent1y or maliciously so 
acts as to make my negligence injurious to a 
third person. If so, the person so intervening 
acts as a non-conductor, and insulates my 
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negligence, so that I cannot be sued ~or th.e 
mischief which the person so intervening di-
rectly produces. He is the one who is liable 
to the person injured. I may be liable to 
him for my negligence in getting him into 
difficulty, but I am not liable to others for 
the negligence which he alone was the cause of 
making operative." 
This case contains an excellent dissertation on 
the subject of proximate intervening and efficient 
cause. 
See also Anderson v. Bransford, 39 Utah 256, 
116 P. 1023. 
No injury to the plaintiff would have occurred 
if defendant Clark, by his actions, had not driven 
his automobile either against or into the direct path 
of the sled. There is no allegation in the complaint 
which in any way indicates the injury would have 
occurred without the intervening action of Clark. 
POINT THREE. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOWS 
UPON ITS FACE THAT THE INJURIES SUSTAINED 
BY PLAINTIFF WERE THE DIRECT AND PROXI-
MATE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DE-
FENDANT, CLARK. 
The allegations of plaintiff's "Third Claim" di-
rectly charged defendant Clark with willful or negli-
gent conduct resulting in injury to the plaintiff. It is 
alleged that Clark knew or should have known of the 
existence of the coasting area and that children were f~ 
using it when he drove his automobile~ so that it Y 
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collided with plaintiff ( R. 6). There is no allegation 
that this defendant knew of the proximity of Clark's 
automobile and so knowing caused plaintiff to coast 
down the steep hill, also knowing or having reason 
to know and believe that there would be a collision. 
Nor is there any allegation that this defendant had 
any control over Clark or the operation of his car. 
It is apparent, then, that his actions were not a con-
curring cause of the accident to plaintiff, even assum-
ing this defendant should have taken steps to have 
prevented plaintiff from coasting from its property 
into a public street. Clark's actions were the direct, 
proximate cause of the accident. Here was an inde-
pendent, efficient cause beyond the control or knowl-
edge of defendant Brigham Young University which 
intervened and was the direct cause of injury. It 
follows, therefore, that the chain of causation having 
been broken by Clark's action, that any act of Brig-
ham Young University, which might in any view of 
the situation be construed as negligence, became, by 
Clark's actions, no more than a remote cause, and 
Brigham Young University is not liable to the plain-
tiff. See Southern Pacific Company v. Ralston, 
supra, Davis v. Mellen, supra, Anderson v. Brans-
ford, supra, Salt River Valley Water Users' Associa-
tion v. Cornum (Arizona), 63 P. 2d 639. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the plaintiff's complaint fails to allege 
facts which can support his contention that Brigham 
Young University maintained on its premises or per-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
mitted to be maintained thereon an attractive nuis-
ance, and because the said complaint likewise fails 
to allege any fact charging actionable negligence 
against the defendant Brigham Young University, 
and finally because the plaintiff's complaint shows 
upon its face that the proximate cause of the in-
jurieS! sustained by the plaintiff, if any, was the 
negligent action of the defendant Clark, the de-
fendant Brigham Young University's Motion to Dis-
miss said cqmplaint was properly granted by the 
trial court and the action of the trial court must be 
sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
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